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A B S T R A C T 
Mobile telecommunication operators routinely charge subscribers lower prices for calls on 
their own network than for calls to other networks (on-net discounts). Studies on tariff-
mediated network effects suggest this is due to large operators using on-net discounts to 
damage smaller rivals. Alternatively, research on strategic discounting suggests small 
operators use on-net discounts to advertise with low on-net prices. We test the relative 
strength of these effects using data on tariff setting in German mobile telecommunications 
between 2001 and 2009. We find that large operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-
net discounts but there is no consistently significant difference in the magnitude of discounts. 
Our results suggest that tariff-mediated network effects are the main cause of on-net 
discounts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“The Autorité de la concurrence [French competition authority] fines Orange and SFR a 
total of €183 million for implementing anticompetitive practices in the mobile telephony 
sector. [Orange and SFR marketed tariffs with] abusive rate differentiation between „on net‟ 
calls (within their respective networks) and „off net‟ calls (to rival networks).” 
 (Autorité de la concurrence, 2012) 
 
In this recent case two large mobile network operators in France were handed down a 
large fine for charging a lower minute price for calls to subscribers on their own network (on-
net) than for calls to subscribers on other networks (off-net). This practice of granting “on-net 
discounts” is common in mobile telecommunication markets; it lowers the compatibility 
between mobile operators‟ networks, creating so-called tariff-mediated network effects 
(Laffont et al., 1998). Since telecommunication markets are subject to network effects, 
compatibility is important for market structures and profitability (Doganoglu and Grzybowski, 
2007; Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Therefore, it is important for both scholars and regulators to 
understand which firms offer on-net discounts and why. 
In the French case, the regulatory authority judged that the on-net discounts offered by 
Orange and SFR harmed competition by locking in customers to large networks and 
weakening a third competitor, Bouygues Télécom (Autorité de la concurrence, 2012). This 
conclusion is supported by theoretical research suggesting that large network operators use 
on-net discounts to leverage their installed bases and force small operators out of the market 
or prevent them from entering (Hoernig, 2007; Laffont et al., 1998). If this is the main 
motivation for on-net discounts, then we would expect to see them offered primarily by large 
operators and regulatory authorities should consider strict regulation. 
However, recent research on marketing and consumer behavior suggests that on-net 
discounts may be used primarily as a marketing tool by small operators. The reason is that on-
net discounts allow small operators to engage in strategic discounting, i.e. to attract customers 
by advertising low on-net prices while recouping profits with high off-net prices (Haucap and 
Heimeshoff, 2011; Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). This strategy would be costly for large 
operators to imitate due to the high opportunity cost of setting low on-net prices with a large 
installed base. If this is the main motivation for on-net discounts, we would expect to observe 
them being offered predominantly by small operators. In that case regulating on-net discounts 
might harm competition by depriving small operators of an important marketing tool.  
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The example from France and a similar case in Germany (German Federal Cartel Office, 
2009) demonstrate that on-net discounts are an important issue. However, to be able to give 
sound policy advice we first need to understand the relative importance of these two effects. 
To our knowledge this has not yet been empirically investigated, i.e. we do not know whether 
on-net discounts are used predominantly by small or by large operators. We address this gap 
by analyzing two related questions: First, are large or small operators more likely to offer 
tariffs with on-net discounts, and second do they offer larger discounts? We do so using data 
on tariff setting in the market for German mobile telecommunications from 2001 to 2009. 
This market setting allows us to clearly differentiate between two groups of competitors, large 
mobile network operators (MNOs) and much smaller mobile virtual network operators 
(MVNOs), and also between MNOs of different size. 
We test whether these groups differ in their tariff setting policies and find that large 
operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-net discounts. On the other hand, we find that 
small operators appear to offer larger discounts, although this effect is not stable across all 
specifications. Our findings suggest that tariff-mediated network effects are the dominant 
mechanism responsible for on-net discounts. We conduct several robustness tests to ensure 
the observed effects are indeed due to network size and not to other unobserved differences. 
Our study is the first to directly test whether large or small operators are more likely to 
offer tariffs with on-net discounts or offer larger discounts. This allows us to draw 
conclusions about the probable mechanisms causing operators to set on-net price discounts, 
contributing to research on competition in the telecommunication industry, and network 
markets in general. We also contribute to the policy discussion by offering tentative evidence 
that regulators may be correct to impose limits on on-net price differentials. In addition, size-
conditional regulation may be an interesting regulatory alternative to explore. 
2. Reasons for On-Net Discounts 
2.1 Tariff-Mediated Network Effects 
Telecommunications is a standard example for an industry with direct network effects and 
a considerable body of research has investigated how they affect competitive behavior and 
welfare (Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Koski and Kretschmer, 2004). Generally, 
telecommunication operators charge consumers for their services using non-linear tariffs that 
comprise several price components like monthly fixed fees, minute prices per call, prices per 
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text message, etc. Some of these tariffs have a lower per-minute price for calls to subscribers 
on the same network than for calls to subscribers on different networks. 
There has been considerable concern among theoretical scholars of network industries that 
on-net discounts may be used to create “tariff-mediated network effects” (Laffont et al., 
1998), with some studies even calling for regulation (Cabral, 2011; Gerpott, 2008; Harbord 
and Pagnozzi, 2010; Hoernig, 2008). Theoretical work has demonstrated that in markets with 
asymmetric players, large operators have an incentive to use on-net discounts as an anti-
competitive instrument to damage smaller rivals (Berger, 2004; Jeon et al., 2004). By 
charging higher prices for off-net than for on-net calls, large operators can reduce the number 
and duration of calls received on the smaller operators‟ networks, making them less attractive 
to potential subscribers (Cabral, 2011; Hoernig, 2007). Large operators may also use on-net 
discounts to forestall entry by making new operators (with small installed bases) less 
attractive to consumers and consequently making entry less attractive (Calzada and Valletti, 
2008). 
In contrast to these arguments, several empirical papers postulate that it is not primarily 
global but rather local network effects that influence consumers‟ purchase decisions. The idea 
is that subscribers‟ utility is not equally increased by every new subscriber joining the 
network, but rather by the decisions of a small subset like friends and family, also known as 
“calling clubs” (Birke and Swann, 2010; Corrocher and Zirulia, 2009; Gabrielsen and 
Vagstad, 2008). This might make on-net discounts less attractive for large operators than in a 
situation with global network effects because consumers in the same calling club tend to 
cluster on networks in any case, so high on-net discounts of large operators would not deter 
entry by small operators. 
However, a number of empirical studies provide evidence for global network effects in 
telecommunication markets. In addition to studies that infer network effects from a positive 
correlation between the size of an operator‟s installed base and its sales (Doganoglu and 
Grzybowski, 2007), there are several others that directly analyze the influence of network 
effects on consumers‟ choices in various markets. They generally concur that network effects 
are important for consumer behavior (Birke and Swann, 2006; Fu, 2004; Kim and Kwon, 
2003). 
In summary, research on tariff-mediated network effects suggests that large network 
operators use on-net discounts as an anti-competitive instrument and that this is important for 
consumers‟ choices. If tariff-mediated network effects are the dominant mechanism causing 
on-net discounts we would expect to observe larger operators being more likely to offer tariffs 
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with on-net discounts and offering larger discounts than their smaller rivals. This is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence that on-net discounts were used as an anti-competitive instrument by 
the incumbent Vodafone in New Zealand (Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2011). 
The introductory example suggests regulators have an interest in preserving competition in 
the market by protecting small operators and potential entrants from anti-competitive behavior 
by large operators. If we find that on-net discounts are predominantly used as an anti-
competitive instrument, this would imply regulators should try to discourage or suppress 
them. They could do so by capping discounts – similar to recent regulation of roaming fees by 
the European Commission – or by banning them outright. An additional alternative would be 
to introduce size-dependent regulation, for example by linking a cap for on-net discounts to 
operators‟ market share. 
An issue closely related to on-net discounts are termination fees (or access prices), fees 
charged by operators to other operators for connecting incoming calls to their subscribers. 
They affect on-net discounts in that they influence firms‟ marginal cost for off-net calls. A 
number of studies have demonstrated that if termination prices are a strategic variable, large 
operators have an incentive to raise them to damage smaller rivals – possibly even collusively 
– in the process raising on-net discounts (Berger, 2005; Cambini and Valletti, 2003; Gans and 
King, 2001; Genakos and Valletti, 2011; Harbord and Pagnozzi, 2010; Hoernig, 2007). Thus, 
when termination fees can be set strategically, the potential problems of anti-competitive 
behavior by large operators are exacerbated. In our empirical setting, termination fees are 
strictly regulated by the national regulator and are not a strategic variable for the operators. 
2.2 Strategic Discounting 
In contrast to the clear prediction from research on tariff-mediated network effects there is 
anecdotal evidence from several European mobile telecommunication markets that small 
operators were the first to introduce on-net discounts (Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2011; Haucap 
et al., 2011). This is surprising given the results cited above as it suggests small operators may 
have stronger incentives to introduce on-net discounts than their larger rivals. 
One explanation is that consumers‟ evaluation of mobile tariff options is not completely 
rational. Recent studies have found that consumers are bad at estimating the proportion of 
their future on-net and off-net calls, causing them to exhibit an excess preference for flat-rate 
tariffs (Lambrecht et al., 2007; Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). It also causes them to 
overestimate the savings from a particularly low on-net or off-net price, a phenomenon 
Haucap and Heimeshoff (2011) call a “price differentiation bias”. 
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Haucap and Heimeshoff (2011) argue that because of the price differentiation bias small 
operators can attract consumers by advertising with low on-net prices while still making 
profits with off-net calls. This strategy is feasible because they have a large proportion of off-
net calls due to their relatively small installed base. It is costly for large operators to imitate 
because they have a larger proportion of on-net calls due to their larger installed base. 
At first glance this line of argument may seem to contradict what one would expect in a 
network market: in those markets, firms with large installed bases normally prefer low 
compatibility while firms with small installed bases prefer high compatibility (Besen and 
Farrell, 1994). One reason this strategy may be feasible nevertheless is local network effects, 
which we described above. If local network effects are more important than global network 
effects, a strategic discounting strategy may be feasible because groups of consumers cluster 
on networks, reducing the importance of compatibility on a global scale. On the other hand, 
local network effects may also reduce the attractiveness of strategic discounting for small 
operators: if most of consumers‟ calls are placed on their own network then small operators‟ 
opportunity to recoup profits with off-net calls is reduced. We are unable to estimate the 
relative importance of these two mechanisms; further research in this area would be 
interesting. 
Together, these results provide an explanation for why on-net discounts may be attractive 
for small telecommunication operators. They suggest we should observe small operators 
offering on-net discounts. If this is the case, regulators should carefully consider whether 
regulating on-net discounts might be harmful to small operators and by extension to 
competition. 
Note that the two alternative explanations for on-net discounts – tariff-mediated network 
effects and strategic discounting – are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible that 
they are both correct to a degree and cancel out, in which case we would not observe a clear 
preference for on-net discounts either by small or large operators. It is also conceivable that 
both of them are wrong, although this seems unlikely given the body of supporting evidence 
for each theory. 
3. Empirical Setting 
The empirical setting for our study is the German market for mobile telecommunications 
between 2001 and 2009. This section provides a brief overview of the market. 
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3.1 Technical Standards and Market Growth 
Two technical standards provided the basis for mobile telecommunications in Germany 
during the period covered by our dataset: The GSM standard (Global System for Mobile 
Communications) had been in use since 1993. In addition, in 2004 networks operating on the 
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) standard were activated, after which 
all competitors in the market operated on both standards in parallel. 
During the period under observation the market for mobile telephony in Germany grew 
rapidly. This development had begun in the mid-1990s and started to slow down towards the 
end of our observation period. For example, between 2001 and 2009 the penetration rate 
(subscriptions divided by total population) almost doubled from 68% to 132% (German 
Federal Network Agency, 2010). Total usage also increased strongly with outgoing calls from 
mobile networks tripling from 31 bn. minutes in 2001 to 94 bn. minutes in 2009 (German 
Federal Network Agency, 2005, 2010). 
3.2 Operators 
Three types of companies are active in the German mobile telecommunication market. 
First, there are four large mobile network operators (MNOs) that entered the market prior to 
1995 and jointly held well over 80% market share (T-Mobile, Vodafone, E-Plus and O2). Of 
the four MNOs, T-Mobile and Vodafone were substantially larger than the other two: In 2004 
they had approximately 27 million subscribers each while E-Plus and O2 had only 9.5 and 7.4 
million subscribers, respectively (Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix). Although the 
smaller operators gained some ground during the period under observation, the market shares 
remained fairly stable. They also have similar business models: they are all vertically 
integrated companies targeting a mass market from rare callers to heavy business users. They 
all sell tariffs and operate extensive retail chains, and also own and operate infrastructure for 
telecommunication services including masts, switches, backbones, and bandwidth licenses. 
The second group of companies comprises 67 mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs, 
e.g. SVEN or AldiMobil), the first of whom entered the market beginning in late 2004 and 
early 2005. Since then they rapidly gained ground but during the period covered by this study 
they held a joint market share of below 20%, meaning they were an order of magnitude 
smaller than the MNOs (German Federal Network Agency, 2009). In contrast to the MNOs 
they do not own or operate their own infrastructure. Instead, they buy airtime wholesale from 
the MNOs and use it to construct new tariffs that are sold under their own brand. MVNOs 
generally focus on low-usage market segments and some of them are subsidiary brands of 
MNOs specifically targeting those segments (e.g. Congstar or Simyo). 
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The final group of companies in the market is made up of 23 tariff resellers (e.g. 
Mobilcom or Freenet). Most of these companies operate extensive branch networks in 
Germany from which they sell MNO tariffs. In contrast to MNOs and MVNOs, tariff resellers 
generally do not actually provide mobile telecommunication services, i.e. they do not 
structure and sell tariffs under their own brand. Instead, they operate as an independent 
distribution platform for MNO tariffs and the vast majority of their offering comprises MNO 
tariffs sold under a joint brand. They were excluded from the analysis in this study as 
including them would have artificially inflated the number of tariffs in the market. 
3.3 Regulation 
The market is subject to regulation by the German Federal Network Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur). Most importantly, MNOs are required to ensure interoperability 
between their networks. When receiving a call from another network that terminates on their 
own network they may charge a termination fee. The termination fees are strictly regulated by 
the Federal Network Agency based on an estimation of the different competitors‟ marginal 
costs. The maximum permissible termination fees during the period covered by our dataset 
are given in Table 1. Two patterns are striking there: First, the two smaller MNOs were 
allowed to charge higher termination fees than the larger ones due to their higher marginal 
costs (lower market share and hence lower economies of scale) and second, overall 
termination fees were reduced over time. Termination fees are closely linked to on-net 
discounts and we discuss below how they are taken into account in the econometric analyses. 
Note that MVNO tariffs always operate on one of the MNOs‟ networks. They are therefore 
subject to the same set of termination fees as the MNO whose infrastructure they use. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
3.4 Tariffs with On-net Discounts 
Figure 1 illustrates how the number of tariffs introduced in the market grew between 2001 
and 2008. It shows the number of newly introduced tariffs by MNOs and MVNOs (light and 
dark bars, respectively). Note the entry of the MVNOs in late 2004 and the subsequent rise in 
the MVNOs‟ proportion of newly introduced tariffs. The figure also shows the proportion of 
new tariffs with on-net discounts. Two developments are notable: In the early 2000s a 
majority of MNO tariffs had on-net discounts (74% in 2001) but this proportion decreased to 
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43% by 2008. Second, approximately 20% of newly introduced MVNO tariffs had on-net 
discounts – substantially less than the MNOs. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
In an investigation by the German Federal Cartel Office (German Federal Cartel Office, 
2009) E-Plus, one of the smaller MNOs, registered a complaint in 2007 against the two larger 
MNOs for misusing on-net discounts to cement their position as market leaders. In 2009 the 
Cartel Office dropped the case, arguing that on-net discounts no longer played a major role in 
the German mobile telecommunication market. This is consistent with the decreasing trend in 
the proportion of new tariffs with on-net discounts in our dataset, but seems somewhat 
surprising given the still relatively large proportion in 2008. 
This decrease in the proportion of tariffs with on-net discounts could have several reasons. 
It could be due to the increasing importance of flat-rate tariffs or the regulated decrease in 
termination fees discussed above (German Federal Cartel Office, 2009). An alternative 
explanation is that increasing saturation in the market caused the number of new subscribers 
to decrease for all operators. This could mean that on-net discounts become less attractive for 
operators because their effect is reduced – there are simply less new subscribers to attract with 
them. We leave a detailed investigation of these questions to future research, noting only that 
despite the fact that they lost some of their importance in Germany, on-net discounts were a 
common instrument during the period covered by our dataset. They also remain a pervasive 
phenomenon in telecommunication markets in general. 
4. Data and Estimation 
4.1 Data 
We observe tariffs introduced to the German market for mobile telecommunications from 
1/2001 to 2/2009. The data were gathered by teltarif.de, a price comparison website tracking 
all mobile tariffs in the German market, and was subjected to extensive cleaning. The most 
important steps of the data cleaning process are described in the Appendix B. Our 
observations for most models are at the tariff-level, i.e. each observation corresponds to a new 
tariff in the month it was first introduced. For each tariff we can uniquely identify the operator 
offering it, whether or not it had an on-net price discount, and how large the discount was. 
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Data on the MNOs‟ market shares were taken from the Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix, 
a report on the development of the global mobile telephony markets published on a quarterly 
basis by the US investment bank Merrill Lynch. Data on market shares of the MVNOs were 
not available. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
Our first empirical question is whether larger operators are more likely to offer tariffs with 
an on-net discount. We therefore estimate the probability that any given tariff has an on-net 
discount, i.e. that the off-net minute price is larger than the on-net minute price. To do so we 
estimate a logit model with standard errors clustered at the level of the firm. 
Our second empirical question is whether larger operators offer larger on-net discounts. 
For this question we restrict the sample to only tariffs with a non-zero on-net discount and 
measure the relative difference between on-net and off-net minute prices. This can be 
interpreted as the discount in percent that is granted subscribers for placing calls on their own 
operator‟s network rather than calling consumers on other networks. We use OLS models for 
these estimations, again clustering standard errors at the level of the firm. 
Our main independent variable is operator size. As described above the operators in the 
market fall naturally into two categories. The MNOs are larger than the MVNOs by an order 
of magnitude, allowing us to clearly identify large and small operators in the market. We use 
a dummy for each operator‟s type as a proxy for its size and compare the differences in tariff 
setting between the MNOs and the MVNOs. This allows us to include all the operators in the 
market despite the fact that size data like the number of subscribers or revenues were 
unavailable for the MVNOs. 
Although the MNO dummy demarcates a clear difference in operator size it is also 
perfectly correlated with a difference in business model between MNOs and MVNOs. 
Whereas the large MNOs own and operate expensive physical network infrastructures, the 
MVNOs operate as wholesalers. Therefore differences in tariff setting due to the business 
models might appear as size effects, creating spurious results. To ensure that this is not the 
case, we conduct robustness tests that exploit the variation in size between the two large and 
the two small MNOs. These two groups share the same business model, so by comparing 
differences in tariff setting between them we can clearly identify the influence of size on tariff 
setting. For these models we use separate dummy variables to uniquely identify firms in each 
of the two groups.  
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4.3 Variables 
We introduce the main variables used in the regressions below. Descriptive statistics and 
pairwise correlations for the dependent, independent and main control variables are reported 
in Tables 2 and 3, respectively (the year dummies are omitted). The correlations between the 
independent variables are all quite low. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
Discount Given 
Our first dependent variable is the probability that a given tariff has an on-net discount. 
We measure this using the dummy variable Discount Given which is coded 1 for each of the 
744 tariffs where the off-net minute price is higher than the on-net minute price, and 0 for the 
other 718. Note that for all tariffs with a difference between on-net and off-net prices, the off-
net prices are always higher.  
Discount Size 
Our second empirical question is whether larger operators offer larger on-net discounts. 
For this question we restrict the sample to tariffs offering an on-net discount. We measure the 
difference using the variable Discount Size = ( pon – poff ) / poff, where pon and poff are the 
minute prices in (euro) cents for on- and off-net calls, respectively. We observe a number of 
tariffs where poff  = 0 but in all of these cases pon  = 0 as well, so the tariffs are not in the choice 
set because the price differential was zero. 
MNO, Small MNO, and Large MNO 
As described above, operator size is proxied by a dummy variable: MNO is coded 1 if a 
tariff is offered by an MNO and 0 otherwise. In addition, we test our results using the 
variation in size between the two large and small MNOs. This is measured with the dummy 
variables Small MNO (1 for E-Plus and O2) and Large MNO (1 for T-Mobile or Vodafone). 
Market and Year Fixed-Effects 
To control for the fact that MNOs and MVNOs emphasize different market segments, we 
include Market Fixed-Effects in the regression models. To do so, we allocate each tariff to one 
of four market segments: rare, low, average and heavy users. The allocation was performed 
with a standardized algorithm, checked by hand, and subjected to extensive robustness tests. 
The procedure is described in the appendix. Dummies are used for the low, average, and 
heavy usage markets with the rare users as the base category. 
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We also include Year Fixed-Effects dummy variables to control for changes over time like 
regulatory changes. 
Termination Fees 
Finally, we include the variable Termination Fees to address the concern that our results 
may be influenced by the different levels of termination fees for different operators at any 
given time as depicted in Table 1. If large MNOs have to pay higher termination fees it seems 
plausible that they would charge higher prices for off-net calls than small MNOs and 
therefore have larger on-net discounts. This would be observationally similar to large 
operators setting larger on-net discounts to induce tariff-mediated network effects. In 
principle this should not strongly influence our main regressions, because here we compare 
MNOs and MVNOs, not large and small MNOs. Therefore the difference in termination 
prices between large and small operators should only matter if MVNO tariffs are 
systematically more likely to operate on small (or large) MNOs‟ networks. Nevertheless, this 
is an important concern and we control for termination fees in all models. 
To control for the effect of termination fees we need to measure an average termination 
fee for each tariff. We therefore construct a control variable as follows: The „incoming‟ 
termination prices in Table 1 are interpolated to financial quarters and weighted with quarterly 
market shares for the four physical networks (T-Mobile, Vodafone, E-Plus and O2) using data 
from the Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix. We assume that mobile phone usage roughly 
reflects network size and calculate an average termination fee for each tariff as the weighted 
average of termination prices to the three networks other than the one on which the tariff 
operates. This measures what each tariff costs the operator in terms of outgoing termination 
fees. 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the 1,462 tariffs in our final dataset. The first 
column shows the number of tariffs offered by the larger and smaller MNOs (T-Mobile and 
Vodafone, and E-Plus and O2, respectively) and the MVNOs. The second and third columns 
give the absolute and relative number of tariffs with an on-net discount. At first glance the 
data in the third column strongly suggest a positive correlation between the relative number of 
tariffs with on-net discounts and operator size: Only 14% of MVNO tariffs have on-net 
discounts, for small MNOs it is 48%, and for large MNOs it is 75%. Apparently, larger 
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operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-net discounts, suggesting our data support 
tariff-mediated network effects as the central driver of on-net discounts. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
For the 744 tariffs that had on-net discounts, the fourth column in Table 4 shows the 
average magnitude of the relative discount, i.e. the difference between the off-net and on-net 
minute prices divided by the on-net minute price. These numbers are also suggestive, but in 
exactly the opposite direction than the probability of discounts: For tariffs with on-net 
discounts, MVNOs offer an average discount of 80%, for small MNOs it is 55% and for large 
MNOs only 49%. This seems to suggest that smaller operators use larger on-net discounts, 
supporting the argument that strategic discounting is the mechanism causing on-net discounts 
for smaller operators. It also seems plausible that the on-net discounts should be larger for 
small operators if they are using them as a strategic marketing tool: in that case they would 
want to exploit the “price differentiation bias” cited above by making the on-net prices 
noticeably low, which would cause large on-net discounts. 
5.2 Main Results 
MNOs vs. MVNOs 
Table 5 reports the results of our main regression models. Model (5-1) shows the results 
(average marginal effects) of the logit regression estimating the probability of a tariff having 
an on-net discount depending on whether it is offered by an MNO or an MVNO. The 
marginal effect of the MNO dummy is highly significant and large: Tariffs offered by MNOs 
are more than 26% more likely to have an on-net discount than those offered by MVNOs. 
This is consistent with the descriptive results in Table 4 and supports the prediction that tariff-
mediated network effects are the main cause of on-net differentials. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
Model (5-4) pertains to our second empirical question, reporting coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) for the OLS regressions estimating the magnitude of on-net discounts 
for the 744 tariffs that had a non-zero discount. The OLS model also bears out the descriptive 
results in Table 4: The coefficient for the MNO dummy is significantly negative, indicating 
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that smaller operators offered larger on-net discounts. Apart from being statistically 
significant the effect is also large in economic terms: small operators offer on-net discounts 
that are around 17 percentage-points larger than their larger rivals. However, while this result 
suggests that strategic discounting may be the cause of on-net discounts it is not consistently 
significant in the other models reported below and we must therefore interpret it with caution. 
Taken together, the results in column (5-1) and (5-4) indicate that whereas large operators 
are more likely to offer discounts, small operators offer larger discounts. 
Currently Offered Instead of New Tariffs 
We focus on newly introduced tariffs because we believe the relevant economic decision 
of determining the on-net discounts is made at the time of the tariff launch. However, if tariffs 
with different on-net discounts are not offered for the same length of time this could distort 
our results. To rule out this possibility, we run another set of regressions in which we include 
one tariff-quarter observation for each tariff currently offered in each quarter. As this 
artificially inflates the number of observations and tariffs do not change over time, we cluster 
the standard errors at the tariff level. In column (5-2) and (5-5) we reproduce the results from 
columns (5-1) and (5-4), using the new data structure of currently offered instead of new 
tariffs. Our results for the MNO dummy are extremely stable both in magnitude and 
significance, making it unlikely that tariffs being on the market for different lengths of time 
influence our results. 
Small vs. Large MNOs 
A possible alternative explanation for our results is that the MNO dummy used as a proxy 
for size is perfectly correlated with a difference in business models between operators. As 
described above, the MNOs are not only much larger than the MVNOs but also vertically 
integrated, each owning and managing its own network infrastructure. By contrast, the 
MVNOs don‟t own or operate network infrastructure, rather buying airtime wholesale from 
the MNOs and repackaging it to tariffs. This could mean our results are due to a difference in 
business model rather than operator size, casting doubt on our conclusions about the causes of 
on-net discounts. 
To explore this alternative explanation we exploit the variation in size between the two larger 
and the two smaller MNOs. In model (5-3) we re-estimate model (5-1), splitting the MNO 
dummy into dummies for small and for large MNOs. This allows us to rule out the effect of 
business models: although the larger and smaller MNOs differ substantially in size they all 
share the same business model. Comparing models (5-1) and (5-3) we see that the effects 
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seem to be mainly due to difference between large MNOs and other firms, implying that our 
results are not due to differences in business model.In model (5-6) we do the same thing for 
the OLS models estimating the magnitude of on-net discounts with similar results. It is 
notable that in these tests the marginal effects of the MNO and Large MNO dummies are not 
only identical in sign and significance but also of very similar magnitude, ranging between 
0.260 and 0.375 (Models 5-1 and 5-3) for the logit models and between -0.151 and -0.169 
(Models 6-5 and 5-4). 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
Tariff Components 
A potential problem could be that our Market Fixed-Effects imperfectly capture the effect 
of different market segments. If tariffs are aimed at different types of consumers and the type 
of tariff offered varies systematically with operator size, this might need more careful 
treatment. We therefore re-estimate models (5-1) and (5-4) including the control variables 
Contract Duration, Free Minutes, and Base Fee. 
Minimum contract duration of a tariff could serve as an alternative mechanism to 
increasing switching costs, possibly altering on-net discounts. For the tariffs offering free 
minutes, subscribers are allotted a certain contingent of calling minutes whose price is 
bundled with the monthly base fee. With a higher fixed fee and a lower minute price these 
tariffs are targeted at subscribers with heavier usage. The variable Base Fee captures the other 
end of the spectrum: Tariffs that do not contain a base fee have ceteris paribus higher minute 
prices, indicating that these tariffs are offered to subscribers with particularly low usage. 
Models including these control variables are reported in columns (6-1) and (6-4) of Table 
6. The result of the logit regression stays qualitatively unchanged compared to model (5-1), 
but the OLS regression loses significance compared to model (5-4). Note that Contract 
Duration, Free Minutes, and Base Fee are tariff components and are therefore set 
simultaneously with the on-net discounts. That makes them highly endogenous to on-net 
discounts, which is why they are only used to check the robustness of our main results. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
Market Shares 
Our results might also be influenced by the use of dummies as proxies for operator size. In 
regressions reported in column (6-2) and (6-5) of Table 6, we therefore use operators‟ Market 
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Share as the main independent variable. Note that as data on market shares for MVNOs were 
unavailable, we reduce the sample to only MNOs for these models. The marginal effect for 
market share on the probability and size of the discount is not significant, which might 
indicate a problem with the size dummy. However, market share is highly collinear with the 
termination fees and years by construction, since the termination fees were set by the 
regulator using operators‟ market shares and reduced over time (see Table 1).  
In the model of the probability of a discount (6-2) the marginal effect of size is of a similar 
order of magnitude to the other models, but including both market share, year dummies and 
termination fees leads to a strongly inflated standard error. For instance, not including the 
year dummies in specification in (6-2) increases the significance of the Market Share variable 
above a 99% level (results not reported in paper), but leaves estimate of the marginal effects 
almost unchanged. We are therefore confident that the lack of significant results in the 
probability model is due to the collinearity between market share and termination fees and not 
to a misspecification in the model. 
For the model of the discount size (6-5) there is a similar multicollinearity problem, but 
here not only does the standard error of the estimated marginal effect increase dramatically, 
but the estimate drops to almost zero. We are therefore more cautious in our interpretation of 
this result, especially since it is also not robust in the other tests. 
Reduced Sample 
Finally, the year fixed-effects may imperfectly capture the effect that MVNOs only started 
entering the market from late 2004. To test for this, we run models (5-1) and (5-4) using only 
data from 2005 to 2009. The results are reported in the columns (6-3) and (6-6) of Table 6. In 
the logit model the MNO marginal effect is smaller but is still significant, whereas the MNO 
marginal effect in the OLS model is no longer significantly different from zero. 
6. Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion 
6.1 Discussion 
We set out to investigate whether tariff-mediated network effects or strategic discounting 
are the dominant motivation behind on-net discounts in mobile telecommunication tariffs. To 
do so we used data from the German mobile telecommunication market between 2001 and 
2009 and analyzed two related questions: are large operators more likely to offer tariffs with 
on-net discounts, and do they offer larger on-net discounts. Initial results (Tables 4 and 5) 
suggest that both explanations may be accurate: larger operators are more likely to offer 
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tariffs with on-net discounts, but smaller operators appear to offer larger on-net discounts. We 
conducted a number of robustness tests to rule out alternative explanations. The first result is 
essentially stable across all these tests. Although in models testing for differences between all 
three groups of operators only the difference between large MNOs and other firms is 
significant, even there the basic effect is visible: larger operators are more likely to offer 
tariffs with on-net price discounts. The second initial result is not robust to different model 
specifications and samples. In models with the magnitude of on-net discounts as the 
dependent variable, the coefficients for operator size variables are consistently negative but 
only significant in the models in Table 5. We conclude that although there are some 
indications small operators may offer larger on-net discounts our data do not allow us to draw 
strong conclusions. 
In sum, our results are consistent with theoretical models that propose tariff-mediated 
network effects are the main driver of on-net discounts. By contrast, despite some indications 
that small operators may offer larger on-net discounts, our findings do not offer consistent 
support for strategic discounting as an explanation for on-net discounts in mobile 
telecommunications. As discussed previously the two explanations imply opposite effects and 
may cancel out. This strengthens our findings regarding the positive effect of operator size on 
the probability of a tariff having an on-net discount. It also offers one interpretation of the 
lack of findings concerning the effect of operator size on the magnitude of discounts, but 
since we only observe a net effect this is speculative.  
Our results may be of interest to regulators. There has been considerable concern that 
large operators use on-net discounts as an anti-competitive instrument and in the French case 
cited above two large operators were forced to pay hefty fines for the practice. We cautiously 
interpret the results presented here as supporting the regulation of on-net discounts by large 
operators. This would enable small operators to continue to use them as a marketing 
instrument but limit their use as an anti-competitive instrument by large operators. However, 
these policy implications should be treated with caution, as they stretch what we can reliably 
infer from the data. 
6.2 Limitations 
Despite several robustness tests our study has limitations. First, we do not observe the 
causal mechanisms proposed by previous theoretical work directly but only behavioral 
patterns consistent with them. Future work directly measuring these effects might provide a 
more detailed picture of the motivations for termination-based price discrimination. 
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Second, we do not observe the number of consumers purchasing each tariff. This means 
we make an implicit assumption that operators only offer tariffs that actually attract 
subscribers. We find this fairly uncontroversial but nevertheless data on sales would allow us 
to directly study the link between termination-based price discrimination, consumer choices, 
and profitability. It would also allow us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
interaction between operators‟ installed bases and their competitive behavior. 
Third, we limit our analysis to mobile telecommunications and exclude fixed-line or other 
telecommunication services. During the period of observation, the two large MNOs offered 
fixed-line and broadband services in addition to mobile telecommunication plans. This 
provided them with an additional instrument to increase consumers‟ switching costs. The 
other operators in the market did not have similar additional competitive instruments to create 
lock-in effects. If anything, firms that can use bundling and cross-selling effects to lock in 
customers should find (costly) on-net discounts ceteris paribus less attractive. However, our 
results suggest that on-net discounts are predominantly used by the very companies who had 
these additional instruments at their disposal: the large MNOs. While this further strengthens 
our confidence in the empirical results, it nevertheless remains an interesting line of enquiry: 
simultaneous studies of the interdependencies between fixed-line, mobile, and broadband 
markets may provide more comprehensive insights into competition through tariff-mediated 
network effects (Pereira and Ribeiro, 2011; Pereira et al., 2011). 
Finally, our data are limited to a turbulent period in the mobile telecommunication 
industry in Germany. A cross-validation of our results in other market settings would be 
beneficial. 
6.3 Conclusion 
On-net discounts are a pervasive phenomenon in telecommunication markets. Although 
there is widespread agreement that they are used as a competitive instrument, there are two 
different explanations for why. On the one hand, research on tariff-mediated network effects 
posits that large operators use on-net discounts to leverage their installed base and decrease 
the attractiveness of smaller rivals (Laffont et al., 1998). This theory predicts that on-net 
discounts should be offered primarily by larger operators. On the other hand, recent work on 
strategic discounting suggests that on-net discounts are used by small operators: they 
advertise with low on-net prices to attract subscribers while keeping off-net prices high to 
ensure profitability (Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2011). This strategy is costly for their larger 
rivals to imitate as low on-net prices would cause them much greater opportunity costs due to 
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their larger networks. This theory implies that on-net discounts should be offered primarily by 
smaller operators. 
Our empirical results show that large operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-net 
discounts. We cautiously interpret this as suggesting that large operators using tariff-mediated 
network effects as a competitive instrument are the dominant reason for on-net price 
differentials. 
Our study contributes to research on competition in network industries. In particular, we 
provide the first empirical test of two alternative theories explaining the phenomenon of on-
net price discounts in telecommunication markets. We show that large firms may indeed 
strategically use tariff-mediated network effects and draw tentative conclusions for regulators. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1: Development of Termination Fees in Germany (in cents) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
T-Mobile 14.39 14.39 15.40 14.20 11.80 10.80 8.78 7.92 7.92 
Vodafone 15.42 15.42 14.30 13.20 11.00 10.20 8.78 7.92 7.92 
E-Plus 19.03 19.03 17.90 16.50 13.70 12.70 9.94 8.80 8.80 
O2 18.77 18.77 17.90 16.50 13.70 12.70 9.94 8.80 8.80 
 
Notes: Fee per minute in cents that each network could charge other networks for incoming 
calls, e.g. in 2001 T-Mobile was allowed to charge any of the others 14.39 cents/minute for 
calls terminating on its network. Source: Kruse (2009) 
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Figure 1: New Tariffs and Proportion of Tariffs with On-Net Discount (2001-2008) 
 
Source: Teltarif data 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Dummy Mean SD Min Max 
Discount Given yes 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Discount Size no 0.28 0.31 0 1 
MNO yes 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Large MNO yes 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Small MNO yes 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Termination Fees no 11.72 2.98 8.06 16.63 
Contract Duration yes 0.84 0.36 0 1 
Base Fee yes 0.84 0.36 0 1 
Free Minutes yes 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Market: Low yes 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Market: Average yes 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Market: Heavy yes 0.35 0.48 0 1 
N =   1,462 
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Discount Given 1.00 
           
(2) Discount Size 0.86 1.00 
          
(3) MNO 0.39 0.26 1.00 
         
(4) Large MNO 0.39 0.26 0.43 1.00 
        
(5) Small MNO -0.05 -0.04 0.43 -0.63 1.00 
       
(6) Termination Fees 0.37 0.20 0.46 0.13 0.26 1.00 
      
(7) Contract Duration 0.07 0.12 0.28 -0.06 0.29 -0.08 1.00 
     
(8) Base Fee 0.20 0.18 0.40 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.68 1.00 
    
(9) Free Minutes -0.25 -0.34 0.28 0.20 0.04 -0.13 0.24 0.26 1.00 
   
(10) Market: Low 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.28 0.15 0.19 -0.03 1.00 
  
(11) Market: Average -0.05 -0.12 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.11 0.14 0.16 0.18 -0.32 1.00 
 
(12) Market: Heavy -0.06 0.13 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.20 0.27 0.31 0.06 -0.41 -0.41 1.00 
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Table 4: Tariffs and On-net Discounts by Operator Type (2001-2009) 
  Tariffs 
Tariffs with 
discount 
% with 
discount 
Average 
discount size 
All MNOs 1135 697 61% 51% 
Large MNOs 568 427 75% 49% 
Small MNOs 567 270 48% 55% 
MVNOs 327 47 14% 80% 
Total 1462 744 51% 53% 
 
Notes: Average discount size is the average difference between on-net and off-net prices as a 
percent of off-net price (only tariffs with non-zero discounts). 
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Table 5: Main Results 
 Prob. discount is given (logit) Size of discount (OLS) 
 (5-1) (5-2) (5-3) (5-4) (5-5) (5-6) 
 Baseline Current 
tariffs 
Small vs. 
large 
Baseline Current 
tariffs 
Small vs. 
large 
       
MNO 0.260*** 0.325***  -0.169* -0.166**  
 (0.089) (0.091)  (0.083) (0.075)  
Small MNO   0.119   -0.192 
   (0.111)   (0.114) 
Large MNO   0.375***   -0.151* 
   (0.137)   (0.073) 
Termination Fees 0.460*** 0.011** 0.132 -0.064 0.002 -0.100* 
 (0.107) (0.005) (0.259) (0.041) (0.003) (0.054) 
Market: Basic 0.223*** 0.197*** 0.218*** -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.041) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
Market: Average 0.088* 0.092** 0.085* -0.038*** -0.048 -0.038*** 
 (0.049) (0.041) (0.047) (0.011) (0.029) (0.011) 
Market: Heavy 0.136* 0.119* 0.138** 0.149*** 0.120** 0.152*** 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.069) (0.036) (0.051) (0.034) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. level Tariff Tariff-
quarter 
Tariff Tariff Tariff-
quarter 
Tariff 
S.E. clusters Firm Tariff Firm Firm Tariff Firm 
Observations 1,462 6,168 1,462 744 3,541 744 
R-squared    0.306 0.306 0.308 
 
Notes: Baseline specifications (5-1) and (5-4) test for differences in tariff choices between MNOs 
and MVNOs (base category). Specifications (5-2) and (5-5) use the sample of all currently offered 
tariffs (on a quarterly level) instead of sampling tariffs only at the time of their introduction. The 
MNO effect is then split up into an effect of small MNOs (E-Plus and O2) and of large MNOs (T-
Mobile and Vodafone) in specifications (5-3) and (5-6). Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
(5-1, 5-3, 5-4, 5-6) or at the tariff level (5-2, 5-5) are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance 
levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). For logit models average marginal effects are reported 
(hence no coefficient for constant). Constants for the OLS models and coefficients for year fixed 
effects are not reported. The base category for markets is Rare Users. The base category for 
operator size is MVNO. 
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Table 6: Robustness Tests 
 Prob. discount is given (logit) Size of discount (OLS) 
 (6-1) (6-2) (6-3) (6-4) (6-5) (6-6) 
 Tariff 
elements 
Market 
shares 
Reduced 
sample 
Tariff 
elements 
Market 
shares 
Reduced 
sample 
       
MNO 0.324***  0.244** -0.123  -0.141 
 (0.063)  (0.099) (0.089)  (0.087) 
Market Share  1.119   -0.000  
  (1.080)   (0.362)  
Termination Fees 0.441*** 0.196 0.390*** 0.002 -0.060 -0.208** 
 (0.122) (0.420) (0.135) (0.043) (0.063) (0.094) 
Runtime contract  0.068   0.049   
    (dummy) (0.054)   (0.048)   
Base Fee  0.099   -0.122   
    (dummy) (0.071)   (0.095)   
Free Minutes  -0.369***   -0.264***   
    (dummy) (0.061)   (0.032)   
Market: Basic 0.140*** 0.157*** 0.357*** 0.072* -0.014 -0.052 
 (0.054) (0.022) (0.079) (0.040) (0.022) (0.070) 
Market: Average 0.063 0.002 0.219** 0.082** -0.040** -0.172** 
 (0.051) (0.040) (0.098) (0.035) (0.010) (0.057) 
Market: Heavy 0.069 0.025 0.268** 0.221*** 0.122** 0.077 
 (0.049) (0.074) (0.126) (0.055) (0.025) (0.078) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,462 1,135 958 744 697 384 
R-squared    0.306 0.306 0.308 
 
Notes: Specifications (6-1) and (6-4) consider additional tariff elements. Specifications (6-2) and 
(6-5) include only MNOs and test for the influence of their market shares. Finally, specifications 
(6-3) and (6-6) include only tariffs launched after 2004. Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). For logit 
models average marginal effects are reported (hence no coefficient for constant). Constants for the 
OLS models and coefficients for year fixed effects are not reported. The base category for markets 
is Rare Users. The base category for operator size is MVNO. 
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Appendix A – Supplementary Material 
Allocation of Tariffs to Markets 
Mobile phone tariffs are obviously targeted at very different market segments, e.g. 
occasional callers and heavy usage business users. Treating all tariffs as competing equally 
for the same consumers could skew our results, so we allocated each tariff to a unique market 
segment. This is achieved using three standard usage baskets defined by the German Federal 
Statistical Agency (2006) for „rare‟, „low‟ and „average‟ cellular phone users. No basket was 
available for business users, so we defined a „heavy‟ user basket as an inflated version of the 
average user basket. The assumptions baskets are detailed in Table A1. 
 
Table A1: Usage baskets 
Usage in minutes (monthly values calculated with BNA baskets of 2000) 
Assumption: Call duration constant over different types 
 Unit Rare  
users 
Low-level  
users 
Average  
users 
Heavy  
users* 
Total duration of calls min 20 60 200 600 
   o/w to own network min 7 27 69 207 
   o/w to other network min 4 9 40 120 
   o/w to fixed-line min 9 24 91 273 
SMS # 20 60 60 180 
* Note: No basket was available for heavy users, therefore two assumptions were made: 
- Call distribution is assumed to be identical to average users. 
- Total call duration is assumed to be 600 min (30min x 20 working days) 
 
Each tariff was allocated to a unique basket („market‟) with the following procedure: 
1. Calculate the monthly cost of each tariff for each of the four user baskets using the 
tariff components and the usage pattern for the baskets. 
2. Using all tariffs, identify the lower 10%-ile in terms of cost for each user basket by 
month. 
3. Calculate the relative distance of each tariff‟s cost to the lower cost percentile for 
each user basket in the month it was introduced. 
4. Allocate each tariff to the basket where the relative distance is smallest. 
In calculating the monthly cost we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume 
calls are distributed evenly over the day. In the period covered by our dataset a decreasing 
number of tariffs differentiate between different times of day; where different rates were 
offered we used the average cost. Second, if off-net prices varied for different operators we 
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used the average off-net price. This affected a negligible percentage of the tariffs in the 
sample. 
The results of the tariff allocation for average monthly user bills are provided in Table A2. 
A potential weakness of the market allocation procedure is that the user baskets were only 
available for 2000. In the time between then and the end of our dataset there may have been 
changes in usage patterns arising endogenously from increasing diffusion and falling prices. 
 
Table A2: Tariff Allocation 
Results of Tariff Allocation to Markets 
  Observations and monthly user bill in EUR 
Market Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Rare 231 10.26 6.35 2.00 29.58 
Low 372 41.65 12.04 14.82 73.99 
Average 352 66.25 24.00 26.00 138.73 
Heavy 507 141.25 55.64 9.00 365.10 
Total 1,462 77.15 61.13 2.00 365.10 
 
However, the allocation was robust towards a wide range of inflation factors for the heavy 
user basket and towards using fiscal quarters rather than months to define the lower cost 
quartile. Results were also robust towards using lower percentiles between 5% and 15%. The 
10%-ile level was chosen because it yielded the most plausible allocation based on a 
qualitative investigation of tariff names. The lists allocating the tariffs to the markets are 
available on request from the authors. 
Data Cleaning 
The data gathered by Teltarif were subjected to extensive cleaning at the operator and 
tariff levels. At the operator level non-mobile operators were excluded from the dataset, e.g. a 
data-service company offering tariffs as an add-on for companies implementing software 
solutions. Three operators who had only a few (<3) tariffs and for whom no information could 
be found on the internet were also dropped from the dataset. Finally, 23 tariff resellers were 
dropped, as discussed in detail in the paper. 
At the tariff level the following tariffs were dropped to avoid distortions in price 
calculations and the calculated number of new tariffs: Bundles whose price covered both a 
mobile tariff and a broadband access, bundles including both mobile and fixed-line tariffs, 
add-on options for tariffs (such as „Extra 100 free SMS‟), and pure data tariffs for mobile 
devices (without calling functionality). Furthermore, we eliminated duplicate tariffs, i.e. 
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identical tariffs offered by the same operator over the same time period under a different 
name, as these did not pose a substantially new offering for consumers. 
Note that tariffs are also influenced by firms‟ strategy of attracting new subscribers by 
subsidizing mobile handsets and subsequently recovering their investment over the duration 
of the tariff contract. While we cannot control for this effect due to a lack of data on handset 
subsidies, we see no reason why this should systematically influence the on-net / off-net price 
differential over and above the robustness tests reported in the paper. 
